Although not yet desperate, the overall situation in South Vietnam at the end of 1963 was far from favorable. Mismanaged and poorly coordinated from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed to fulfill even the most moderate of American and South Vietnamese expectations. Little discernable headway had been made toward restoring any large segment of the populated rural areas to government control. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement of 1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and material down the Laotian corridor into the South. Although the 1963 figure of 4,200 confirmed infiltrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than the figure for the previous year, it was substantial enough to force the government to deviate more and more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet Cong formations from the vital populated areas. To help meet this continuing influx of Communist regulars, the government had committed its ground force to operations against base areas located in the remote hinterlands with increasing frequency. More often than not these multi-battalion offensives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting in scattered and inconsequential clashes with small groups of Viet Cong. The continuation of such actions, of course, worked to the advantage of the Communists as the government forces expended time, energy, and lives without exacting a commensurate price from the enemy. Other disturbing trends had emerged on the South’s battlefields during the course of the year. Following an action fought in the Mekong Delta during early January in which the Viet Cong soundly defeated a multi-battalion ARVN heliborne force, enemy main force units continued to maintain their integrity and fought back when confronted with helicopter assaults. This trend was evident even in the northern provinces where each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared to meet more determined resistance. Aside from the Viet Cong’s new-found confidence in countering heliborne offensives, another source of concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the appearance in the South of several Viet Cong regimental headquarters during the year. The activation of these headquarters, which assumed control of already operational main force battalions, seemed to presage another phase of Communist military escalation.