The outcome of the embryonic power struggle in Saigon hinged largely on control of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Although not considered an efficient military organization by even the most liberal estimates, the 210,000-man National Army was the principal source of organized power available to the quarreling leaders of southern Vietnam. Originally created by the French in 1950 to supplement their Expeditionary Corps, the VNA had since suffered from structural deficiencies. It actually had no organizational echelon between the French-controlled General Staff and the 160 separate battalions. Tied to no regiments or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for operational instructions and logistical support.[1-E] [1-E] Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized into _groupes mobiles_ (mobile groups) by the French for specific offensive operations. But these groups, which were roughly equivalent to a regimental combat team, were never composed entirely of VNA battalions under a Vietnamese command group. A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a degree of inattention on the part of the French compounded the problems which stemmed from the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of these shortcomings the morale of the VNA had deteriorated sharply in the waning stages of the French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire agreement, high desertion rates were reported in almost every Vietnamese battalion. Still, it was evident that he who controlled the National Army would most likely control the government in the area south of the partition line.