The immediate nature of this particular mission left little time for detailed planning and briefing. I Corps headquarters could only advise the Marines of such vital information as the unit’s radio call sign, radio frequency, size, and location. To familiarize himself with the terrain in the vicinity of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel Ross first made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an O-1B. His reconnaissance revealed the landing zone to be “a precarious hill top knob exposed to a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.[11-2] The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron commander returned to Da Nang, exchanged the O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14 helicopters to the pickup point. In accordance with the squadron’s standing operating procedure, Ross, the flight leader, was to land first, drop off a loadmaster, and lift out the first Vietnamese heliteam. Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead helicopter was forced away by heavy small arms fire which punctured the aft section of the aircraft’s fuselage, wounding the loadmaster. The second aircraft, following at close interval, was also hit. Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered the entire formation into a holding pattern out of small arms range while he attempted to persuade the American advisor to move the Vietnamese unit overland a short distance to a less exposed landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S. advisor was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,” Ross concluded, “that his real concern was the shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts about being able to get them moving to the alternate site.”[11-3] After some delay the Vietnamese unit finally moved to the new landing zone, whereupon the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the helicopters were exposed to unnecessary risks. Understandably concerned with problems of this nature which tended to plague all but the larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to make operational decisions based upon considerations beyond their own tactical problems.”[11-4] In this particular case the selection of the exposed hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the Marine commander’s complaints. [Illustration: _Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared landing zone. (USMC Photo A329576)._] During the second week of January, General Greene, the newly appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at Da Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection of the compound and was briefed on operations by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting combat decorations to several members of the task element, Greene departed for Hawaii where he was to visit the FMFPac headquarters.