U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964Whitlow, Robert H.
History
U.S. Marines In Vietnam, Volume 1 (of 9) : $b The advisory & combat assistance era 1954-1964
Whitlow, Robert H.
United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Vietnam War, 1961-1975
When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in the late summer of 1954,
the machinery for implementing the military phase of the American
assistance program for South Vietnam already existed. President
Truman had ordered the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group (USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in mid-1950 as
one of several reactions to the North Korean invasion of the Republic
of Korea. Established to provide materiel support to the French
Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little more than a logistical
funnel through which U.S. military aid had been poured.
Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had
been assigned to command the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s
selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more active U.S. role in
training of the Vietnamese National Army. He had been chosen for the
assignment largely on the basis of his successful role in creating
and supervising the training programs which had transformed the South
Korean Army into an effective fighting force during the Korean War.
Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement, he and his 342-man
group began preparing for the immense task of rebuilding South
Vietnam’s armed forces.
The entire American project to assist the South Vietnamese in the
construction of a viable state was delayed during the fall of 1954
while the necessary diplomatic agreements were negotiated among
American, French, and South Vietnamese officials. President Eisenhower
dispatched General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon
in November to complete the details of the triangular arrangements.
Collins carried with him the broad powers which would be required to
expedite the negotiations.
By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy had paved the
way for the transfer of responsibility for training, equipping, and
advising the Vietnamese National Army from the French to the USMAAG.
He and General Paul Ely, the officer appointed by the Paris government
to oversee the French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed a
“Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with this document, the
United States agreed to provide financial assistance to the French
military in Vietnam in exchange for two important concessions. First,
the French pledged to conduct a gradual military withdrawal from South
Vietnam in order to prevent the development of a military vacuum
which might precipitate a North Vietnamese invasion. Secondly, they
accepted an American plan to assist in a transition stage during which
the responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military could be
transferred to the MAAG in an orderly fashion. General Collins, in
addition to engineering the understanding with General Ely, had advised
Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man military and naval forces to a
level of 100,000, a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the
United States could realistically support and train.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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