So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas reportedly were operating in battalion strength (300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by mid-1959. Throughout the country they had expanded their activities to include hit-and-run attacks on paramilitary posts, district headquarters, hospitals, schools, and agricultural stations. Like the assassination campaign which was underway concurrently in areas still controlled by the GVN, these attacks were conceived with political considerations in mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass the central government while demonstrating their own strength to the local population. The raids, furthermore, produced weapons which enabled the guerrillas to operate without total dependence on the North. By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic of Vietnam had deteriorated to the point that much of the optimism formerly voiced by American and South Vietnamese officials had begun to disappear. The National Intelligence Estimate released in Washington during August accurately described the conditions which were settling over South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the nation’s economy was beginning to falter noticeably and that President Diem’s government was growing increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate warned that harassment by the Viet Cong could be expected to intensify.[3-5] As predicted, security conditions in South Vietnam did grow worse in the period following the August intelligence estimate. In the last four months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were reported. In January 1960 another 96 civilians were killed by the Communists and in the following month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960 the Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing regular ARVN units in several provinces. Like their raids on fixed installations, their ambush tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing defeats for the government. Like the raids, they were also providing weapons and ammunition for the growing guerrilla forces. By 1960 the government’s inability to contain the disturbing malaise was beginning to produce political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a group of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures, including a number of former cabinet members, issued a public demand for President Diem’s resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the arrest of all who signed the manifesto.