General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing President Kennedy’s 29 April program during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the government’s regular and paramilitary establishments and in the size of the MAAG failed to arrest the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s battlefields. The remainder of 1961 was characterized by increasingly aggressive guerrilla operations and the steady growth of Viet Cong military forces. In August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major armed attacks on its units. The following month brought 450 Viet Cong-initiated incidents, including several involving multi-battalion forces of over 1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the capital of Phuoc Thuan Province, and held the town for an entire day before escaping unmolested into the countryside.[3-8] Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the Viet Cong’s overall strength. Increasing numbers of Communist troops were now being infiltrated over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving southwestward out of the North Vietnamese panhandle, these infiltration routes enabled the Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone which separated the two Vietnamese states and continue their southward movement down the length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries within these countries the North Vietnamese could easily infiltrate into South Vietnam by using trails through the rugged mountains. Relying primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam during 1961. Successful recruiting in the South served as another source of manpower for the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady cadence of victories greatly enhanced the Viet Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment less difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the North and recruitment in the South had swollen the Viet Cong regular military forces to an estimated 25,000 men. _Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_