While the new Marine units were forming the JGS ordered the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s southern tip. The objective area was a portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive inundated region located along the western coast of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible by land, the forest had served as Communist base area since the French Indochina War. The concept of operation called for the Marines to land at daybreak, move inland through the mangrove swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements into ARVN units which would have established a blocking force inland from the beach. Captains Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S. Marine advisors, embarked on board two World War II vintage Vietnamese Navy LCIs (landing craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d Battalions respectively. [Illustration: _Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese officers. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC)._] A series of problems arose on the morning of the operation to delay the landing for several hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late in the morning they failed to locate any enemy forces. Captain Gott, who accompanied the 1st Battalion for the duration of the operations ashore, later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for instance, that no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked on board the Vietnamese ships. As a result, the relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered technical difficulties with their navigational aids, and the ships arrived at the objective area late. Inexperience on the part of the Vietnamese Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques compounded the delay. Once ashore, outdated French maps and dense mangrove jungle combined to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing the Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott concluded that some of the difficulties encountered after the landing phase of the operation might have been offset by the presence of observation aircraft. As it was, the Marines’ visibility was restricted throughout the operation by thick mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of unforeseen factors had rendered this particular operation ineffective.[3-13] [Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST 1961 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321]