This may be true or not, but it is at any rate intelligible; whereas much that is written about “fraying channels” raises no definite ideas in the mind. {80a} I interpret this, “We cannot wonder if often-repeated vibrations gather strength, and become at once more lasting and requiring less accession of vibration from without, in order to become strong enough to generate action.” {80b} “Characteristics” must, I imagine, according to Professor Hering, resolve themselves ultimately into “vibrations,” for the characteristics depend upon the character of the vibrations. {81} Professor Hartog tells me that this probably refers to Fritz Müller’s formulation of the “recapitulation process” in “Facts for Darwin,” English edition (1869), p. 114.—R.A.S. {82} This is the passage which makes me suppose Professor Hering to mean that vibrations from exterior objects run into vibrations already existing within the living body, and that the accession to power thus derived is his key to an explanation of the physical basis of action. {84} I interpret this: “There are fewer vibrations persistent within the bodies of the lower animals; those that there are, therefore, are stronger and more capable of generating action or upsetting the _status in quo_. Hence also they require less accession of vibration from without. Man is agitated by more and more varied vibrations; these, interfering, as to some extent they must, with one another, are weaker, and therefore require more accession from without before they can set the mechanical adjustments of the body in motion.” {89} I am obliged to Mr. Sully for this excellent translation of “Hellsehen.” {90a} _Westminster Review_, New Series, vol. xlix. p. 143. {90b} Ibid., p. 145. {90c} Ibid., p. 151. {92a} “Instinct ist zweckmässiges Handeln ohne Bewusstsein des Zwecks.”—_Philosophy of the Unconscious_, 3d ed., Berlin, 1871, p. 70. {92b} “1. Eine blosse Folge der körperlichen Organisation. “2. Ein von der Natur eingerichteter Gehirn-oder Geistesmechanismus. “3. Eine Folge unbewusster Geistesthiitigkeit.”—_Philosophy of the Unconscious_, 3d ed., p. 70. {97} “Hiermit ist der Annahme das Urtheil gesprochen, welche die unbewusste Vorstellung des Zwecks in jedem einzelnen Falle vorwiegt; denn wollte man nun noch die Vorstellung des Geistesmechanismus festhalten so müsste für jede Variation und Modification des Instincts, nach den äusseren Umständen, eine besondere constante Vorrichtung . . . eingefügt sein.”—_Philosophy of the Unconscious_ 3d ed., p. 74. {99} “Indessen glaube ich, dass die angeführten Beispiele zur Genüge beweisen, dass es auch viele Fälle giebt, wo ohne jede Complication mit der bewussten Ueberlegung die gewöhnliche und aussergewöhnliche Handlung aus derselben Quelle stammen, dass sie entweder beide wirklicher Instinct, oder beide Resultate bewusster Ueberlegung sind.”—_Philosophy of the Unconscious_, 3d ed., p. 76.