It is unnecessary and futile, in this brief chapter, to go fully into the story of the panic of 1907, or of the events that preceded it. Suffice it to say that the panic followed a period of enormous expansion and of extension of credit eventually carried to a point where business overreached itself and, in a country lacking an elastic currency system, such as the United States then was, financial stringency was bound to follow. The first rumblings of the coming storm went unheeded, and it was not until late in the year that there was any realization of the desperate state of affairs. Then one big trust company closed its doors and was followed by others. Banks stopped specie payments, stocks tumbled headlong on the exchanges of the country, industry halted, throwing thousands out of employment, and the financial hurricane swept over the country, leaving ruin in its wake and making its effects felt over the whole world. While the panic came like a thunderclap to the average citizen, without warning, the big bankers had seen the danger threatening and had made an effort to prevent any occurrence which might precipitate matters. In the latter part of October rumors gained circulation that the Knickerbocker Trust Co., one of the leading financial institutions of New York City, was in trouble and the late J. Pierpont Morgan, who had assumed the leadership of the country’s bankers in the crisis, and others had an examination made of the company’s affairs with a view to rendering it assistance. Apparently the result of this investigation was unsatisfactory. Anyway, the Knickerbocker Trust Co. was abandoned to its fate and, at fifteen minutes to one, on October 22nd, closed its doors after a sensational run, many stock exchange firms being overwhelmed in the crash. Thus did the panic storm break. Rumors of trouble in connection with other institutions then came thick and fast, and one concern, the Trust Co. of America, was especially talked of. This institution had a capital of $2,000,000 and resources of $74,000,000, including $12,000,000 cash in its vaults at the time. Under normal conditions it was perfectly solvent and able to meet its depositors’ claims, but that it was not in a position to withstand a prolonged run was proved by subsequent events. Realizing that the failure of the Trust Co. of America would make the crisis far more acute Mr. Morgan and his associates resolved to come to its assistance, provided it could prove that its statements of condition were correct.