Moore & Schley was deeply mixed up with the affairs of the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. One of the members of the firm was a member of the syndicate that controlled the company, and Tennessee stock constituted a considerable proportion of the collateral which it had put up to secure loans for itself and its customers. This stock, considered good collateral in normal times, failed to find favor with the bankers to whom Moore & Schley was heavily committed in the time of stress, and the brokers were called on to replace the securities with others of a more approved character--which they were unable to do--or to suffer the calling of their loans and consequent bankruptcy. Only two courses were open to the brokers, either to borrow a sum large enough to meet their loans or to negotiate an exchange of the Tennessee stock for some other security which the banks would accept. They chose the latter and, realizing that the United States Steel Corporation was the only possible buyer of the Tennessee stock, approached Morgan through Ledyard to that end. Suggestions that the Steel Corporation should purchase control of the Tennessee properties had been made in the past to the Corporation interests by one or more of the directors of the southern company. It does not appear, however, that these suggestions were authorized by the Tennessee syndicate as a whole. Be that as it may, they came to naught, as the directors in question seemed to have a very high idea of the value of the Tennessee stock, and the divergence of opinion on this question between them and the possible purchasers was so great that no middle ground was possible. Never did the tentative offers to sell reach a point where they were worthy of the term “negotiations.” One of the reasons alleged for the Steel Corporation’s supposed fear of the Tennessee company’s competition was that the company was the potential basis for a merger of the steel concerns in the South which would not only be strong enough to offer a stubborn fight to the “trust” for business in the section below the Mason and Dixon line, but would have a distinct advantage over it in exporting steel to Mexico and Central and South America.