It is, however, a grave mistake to suppose that judges exercise their judicial power in a distasteful and arbitrary manner merely because they hold for life or during good behavior. An arbitrary or disagreeable course of action by a judge arises principally from the fact that he is subject to no authority which can receive complaints against him and act upon those complaints by way of private or public criticism and correction of the judge. The best protection against arbitrary and disagreeable actions by judges is a duly constituted body of fellow judges who hold a position of superior power and authority and to whom complaints as to the conduct of judges may be brought and who may investigate those complaints and exercise a corrective influence. When a considerable number of judges in a metropolitan district are provided with a chief justice and organized for the efficient handling of a great volume of business, the means of securing the exercise of a corrective influence over their conduct at once appears. Such a court must be organized into divisions for the purpose of handling specialized classes of litigation. In a metropolitan district like Chicago there should be an appellate division with from six to nine judges sitting in groups of three, a chancery division of six judges with a corps of masters, a probate and family relations division with at least four judges and a corps of masters and assistants, a common-law division with fifteen to eighteen judges and a corps of masters, and a municipal court division with thirty-three judges. The chief justice should be the presiding justice of the appellate division and each of the other divisions should have a presiding justice with large powers over the way in which the work of each division is handled. The chief justice and the presiding justices of divisions should form a judicial council or executive committee, with considerable powers over the way the court as a whole is run. To such a judicial council there should be committed the power to remove from office any judge, other than the chief justice, and to reprove, either privately or publicly, or transfer any such judge to some other division of the court for inefficiency, incompetency, neglect of duty, lack of judicial temperament, or conduct unbecoming a gentleman and a judge, for the good of the service, or to promote its efficiency. The power of removal by the council should be exercised only where written charges have been filed and after an opportunity has been given to the judge to be heard in his own defense.