The existence of a judicial council composed of the chief justice and the presiding justices of the different divisions of the court, each one responsible for the way in which the work of his division is handled, suggests also a practicable way in which to stimulate efficiency at the bar, provide a service test for candidates for places on the bench, and subject the appointing power of the chief justice to a slight but reasonable control. The judicial council should be given power to appoint upon an eligible list for each division of the court twice as many members of the bar as there are judges in the division. The chief justice, in appointing judges to a place in any division of the court, should be required to select from this eligible list on the occasion of every other appointment at least. The operation of such a plan would be to place in the hands of the presiding judges of divisions an express authority to suggest what members of the bar practicing before their divisions respectively would make satisfactory judges for each division. It would also operate to stimulate the efforts of lawyers and promote competition to secure places upon such eligible lists by specialization in practice before particular divisions. This would develop an expertness in the handling of litigation which does not now exist on the part of any considerable number of the bar. We may then conclude that in a metropolitan district with a hundred thousand electors and upward judges cannot be elected. They must be appointed. If an election is attempted it is a failure and appointment results. The worst method of appointment is the secret and irresponsible appointment by politocrats. The most promising is the conspicuous and legal appointment by a chief justice elected at large in the district at frequent intervals. Every objection to such a plan and every prejudice against it may be met by provisions for the retirement of the chief justice and his appointees by impeachment, by legislative and popular recalls, and by the power of the judicial council to discipline and remove any judge other than the chief justice. It is even possible under such a plan to promote efficiency by securing an eligible list of men whose experience in practice under the eyes of the judges insures excellence in appointment. FOOTNOTES: