Unpopular government in the United StatesKales, Albert Martin
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Unpopular government in the United States
Kales, Albert Martin
United States -- Politics and government
leaders unless elections are held at different times in different
districts. Second, if elections are held at the same time in all
districts the elector might be permitted to vote for a candidate
running in his own or any other district. This would enable the party
to switch some of its votes in a district where it was strong to
special leaders standing for election in districts where their success
was in doubt. This is one of the proposals of the People’s Power
League of Oregon. Third, a direct way of accomplishing the desired
result would be to permit each party polling at least 25 per cent of
the total vote cast at an election for members of the legislature to
appoint as many representatives as the entire party vote contains
tenths of the total vote cast. Fourth, the same result might be
obtained by providing for the election at large of a small number of
legislators by “quotas,” according to the Hare plan.[17]
Now observe the effect of the application of the principles of the
commission form of government for cities to the state government. The
office of legislator has been made important and conspicuous because it
is the only office in the state government (except that of governor)
for which the voter casts his ballot, and because the successful
candidate will cast one of two hundred ballots for the selection of
the real executive. Under such a system it is certain that the voter
will know in advance that a vote for candidate A means a vote for B,
as the real executive or leader of the council of state. Thus a vote
for state legislator will be a vote to confer the entire legislative
and executive power of the state upon a given group of legislators
and their leaders. We have indeed made the voting privilege of the
elector so important that he will not only be sure to vote, but he
may be expected to do much to keep himself fully informed about the
candidates. We have made the act of voting so simple that the elector
cannot fail to use such intelligence as he has and to spend any extra
time which he may have in informing himself further. By providing for
the election of single legislators from wieldy districts or by wieldy
“quotas” we have brought the voter as near the candidates as possible.
By stimulating the number of candidates we have given the voter as
wide a range of choice as possible. These devices all have a tendency
to eliminate the politically ignorant vote. The actual intelligence of
the electorate is given the fullest possible play, and even stimulated
to unusual efforts of comprehension. This is a guaranty, and it is the
only guaranty, against that political ignorance on the part of a large
number of voters which provides the opportunity for the professional
politician to step in and, in the guise of advising and directing the
voter how to vote, in effect to cast his ballot for him. The essential
condition upon which a vote-directing political machine is founded and
maintained has, therefore, been eliminated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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