The governor may appoint officers not exceeding ten in number to administer such departments of the state as the governor in council may establish and until such establishment, to administer the departments of state, public accounts, treasury, public instruction, justice, and state institutions. Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the governor. They shall be the members of the executive council and after the first general election of members of the general assembly, as herein provided, _no member of the executive council shall hold office for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes a member of either house[16] of the general assembly_. The necessary result of such changes would be that the governor could do no important act without the consent of the council. The council would in fact be the executive. The election which put the governor in office might be expected to put a majority of the same party in the legislature, and the executive council would naturally be selected from the leaders of that majority. Even if the governor and the majority of the legislature belonged to different parties, yet there would be the strongest motive for the selection of an executive council from the majority of the legislature, thus avoiding the responsibility for a contest between the majority in the legislature and the executive which would throw the government into confusion. The complete success of a plan which involves the union of the executive and legislative power in the leaders of a majority of the legislature requires the presence in the legislature of some at least of the leaders of the principal parties. The absence from the legislature of such leaders would leave the control of the most important powers of government in the hands of the less experienced and less able members of the party. The opposition also might have a less effective representation. This would be a serious matter for the parties themselves. The public service also would suffer. It is in the interest of the best administration of the affairs of state that the ability and experience of the party leaders of both the majority and the minority be kept in the service of the state as long as possible. It is also important that the executive and legislative powers be exercised for the benefit of the state as a whole and not for the purpose of furthering the parochial interests of individual legislators. This is most surely accomplished by the presence in the legislature of the party leaders of the majority. There are several ways of insuring the return to the legislature of some at least of the leaders of the principal parties, even when they may not be able to secure a plurality of the votes cast in the district where they run: First, candidates for the legislature may be permitted to stand for election in any district of the state, no matter where they reside. That does not go far, however, in the direction of returning party