in which is united the executive and legislative power. There are two ways at least of meeting this question: The first is to do nothing at all. Property is to be persuaded that it is in the long run entirely safe at the hands of a legislature which is really expressive of the will of the majority and sensitive to that will; that property has money with which to advocate its cause and can buy newspapers, circulate pamphlets, and hire speakers; that the mass of the electorate are in general entirely fair and conservative toward property; that property is protected by the courts and by constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of property without due process of law from sudden and violent legislative action. This attitude will, however, hardly satisfy property interests. How they will be treated by a single legislative chamber representing the popular will cannot be determined till the experiment is actually tried. All a priori views are merely speculative opinions made up from data wholly incomplete and inconclusive. Property interests will naturally regard it as unfair that they should take the risk of a new experiment in government. Nor will property be satisfied with protection by the courts as now constituted. The fact that judges are for the most part elected by popular vote, that the recall of judges and of judicial decisions is being violently advocated, will hardly tend to reassure property in the protection from the electorate by the courts to which it believes itself fairly entitled. The second method of meeting the demand of property for protection from the single popular legislative chamber is to give it a direct representation in the legislature and a voice in the enactment of the laws at the time they are in the process of making. The representatives of property should have power to propose legislation, to amend that which comes from the popular legislative chamber, and to enter into compromises respecting it. They should have in addition at least a limited veto on the passage of laws. The exercise of such powers should be open and legal, but at the same time entirely subordinate to the power of the representatives of the electorate in the single popular chamber. This requires the establishment of a second legislative chamber in which the representatives of property interests shall sit.