[27] “A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent character--when composed of the same persons habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their own House--easily becomes despotic and overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls, makes it desirable there should be two chambers; that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the space of a single year.” [28] “Of all the forms of government that are possible among mankind I do not know any which is likely to be worse than the government of a single omnipotent democratic chamber.” [29] “What, then, is expected from a well constituted Second Chamber is _not a rival infallibility, but an additional security_. It is hardly too much to say that, in this view, almost any Second Chamber is better than none.” [30] “With a perfect Lower House it is certain that an Upper House would be scarcely of any value. If we had an ideal House of Commons perfectly representing the nation, always moderate, never passionate, abounding in men of leisure, never omitting the slow and steady forms necessary for good consideration, it is certain that we should not need a higher chamber. The work would be done so well that we should not want any one to look over or revise it. And whatever is unnecessary in government, is pernicious.... But though beside an ideal House of Commons the Lords would be unnecessary, and therefore pernicious, beside the actual House a revising and leisured legislature is extremely useful, if not quite necessary.” [31] “The main end for which a Senate is constructed [is] that all legislative measures may receive a second consideration by a body _different in character from the primary representative assembly_, and if possible superior or supplementary in intellectual qualifications.” [32] See J. A. R. Marriott, “History of the Canadian Second Chamber” in _Second Chambers_, pp. 145 ff. [33] The phrase “recall of judicial decisions” is unfortunate, since it implies that the judicial function is taken over by the electorate and the judicial decision reversed, when all that is done is to amend the constitution so that the basis for the judicial decision is taken away in all subsequent litigation. The better phrase, it is believed, is the one used in the text, namely, “steam-rollering the judicial veto.” See Albert M. Kales, “The Recall of Judicial Decisions,” _Illinois State Bar Association Proceedings_, 1912, pp. 203-18; Herbert Pope, “The Recall of Judicial Decisions--A Criticism,” 7 _Illinois Law Review_, p. 149.