Unpopular government in the United StatesKales, Albert Martin
History
Unpopular government in the United States
Kales, Albert Martin
United States -- Politics and government
[34] Ramsay Muir, in _Peers and Bureaucrats_, has a suggestion for
a second chamber that should not be ignored. He finds the evil of a
popular chamber containing a large number of representatives from
wieldy districts selected by pluralities merely to be that it makes
government by party a necessity. The parties tend to form themselves
into two great camps, with two great programs. The electorate has been
driven to choose one program or the other, though if all shades of
opinion could be examined some part of each program would not receive
a majority of votes. Party discipline, however, becomes so strict that
the first chamber can put through every part of the party program. The
real need in the second chamber, he declares, is to secure members of
independent views who can express their opinions freely without fear
of the loss of their seat as a punishment for having been independent,
and which will represent the different shades of opinion on the part of
the electorate. He, therefore, advocates the selection of members of
the second chamber by the method of proportional representation by the
single transferable vote according to the Hare plan.
The difficulty with this proposal is that property interests as such
are not represented except according to the numerical strength of
property owners. In fact, Mr. Muir expressly repudiates any idea of
creating a second chamber based upon an aristocracy or the middle
class of income taxpayers. His plan might also be expected to involve
a contest as to which chamber really represented the electorate. The
second chamber as proposed by Mr. Muir would certainly be a “rival
infallibility” and hopeless deadlocks might be expected. There would
then be the usual American spectacle of bickering between the executive
as represented by the executive council or cabinet of the first
chamber, and the second chamber representing the electorate. On the
whole the union of the executive and the legislative powers so much to
be desired would be broken in upon.
CHAPTER XVII
METHODS OF SELECTING AND RETIRING JUDGES
Justice is not administered by an executive head planning how a large
number of employees shall do clerical work or tend machines. Its
ultimate source is in the operation of the mind of the judge upon
certain facts presented to him in a judicial investigation. The power
of the state to preserve order and settle the rights of parties is
subject to be invoked in one way or another, according as the judge’s
mind reacts and operates. Clearly, therefore, the way in which the
minds are selected for this important public duty and the way they are
retired is of the first importance to the due administration of justice.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account