It is highly desirable that the Boer commandos should not be accompanied by many commissariat waggons laden with provision, tents and other things, as they tend to hinder them, and prevent their executing quick movements. In calculating the chances in this war, it has always been considered that the Boers have their greatest advantage in being independent of commissariat transport, and although provision must be made to be in touch with certain points with the necessary provision for the commissariat, these, notwithstanding, must be viewed as items wherewith, considering the great interests at stake, too much care is not needed to be taken. On this ground the British troops are far ahead of the Boers, on account of their proper organisation, and it is indeed to be regretted that a like department has not been established, especially as the Boers would be specially fitted for it, and have up to this time made so little use of their talent in this direction. Herein a serious instance is brought as an example, namely, the fact that the English troops could retreat in order from Dundee, without its being directly known. Also the disaster at Elandslaagte must be ascribed thereto, where small isolated troops, consisting of a mixed commando, were surrounded in positions not advantageous to their mode of warfare, and, even had our troops at that place been in a defensible position, they were "not in touch" with other troops, who could hasten to their assistance. As to plans which are reckoned to be the best to obtain the victory for the Republican arms, it is an axiom that the deeper one penetrates into an enemy's country, the more one's power is weakened by the necessity for keeping up communication, but there is an exception to every rule, and this war at the present time makes the exception. The Boer forces strengthened their resources, instead of weakening them, by their invasion of Natal and of the Cape Colony. A great proportion of the inhabitants of these Colonies are friendly, and they will thus always keep communication open, even when they take no active part in warlike operations. Taking this as granted, the conclusion is arrived at that the whole design of the Republican commanders should be to push their troops as far as possible, until they reach a war basis or boundary line.