Washington and the Riddle of PeaceWells, H. G. (Herbert George)
History
Washington and the Riddle of Peace
Wells, H. G. (Herbert George)
Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1921-1922 : Washington, D.C.); Peace; World politics
Their linguistic isolation is likely to prove unfortunate for the
French. The Belgian, the Dutch, the Chinese, Japanese and Portuguese
delegations all speak in English and listen to the English speeches.
Consequently, the French are in a position in which they seem to be the
most foreign people present. This must be disconcerting to them now.
It will be much more disconcerting if, at a later stage, German
delegates speaking English should appear upon some extension or side
committee of the conference. But I do not see how it can be avoided. The
French are a little out of touch in the conference because of this; they
must be much more out of touch with the incessant conversation in clubs
and at dinner tables and everywhere in Washington, which makes the
atmosphere in which the conference is working.
This, however, is a note by the way. Secretary Hughes took the chair and
delivered his address. It was a very carefully arranged surprise and its
effect was really dramatical. It jumped the conference abruptly from the
fine generalizations that had hitherto engaged it to immediately
practical things. Secretary Hughes sketched out what was evidently a
carefully worked out scheme, a most explicit scheme, for the complete
cessation of naval armament competition.
America wanted at the very outset, he said, to convince the world that
she meant business in the conference, and so she had taken this
unexpected step of putting immediate practical proposals upon the table.
She would scrap completely all the ships she had still under
construction and all her older ships and she would discontinue all naval
construction for ten years if Britain and Japan would do the same.
She proposed that the naval strength of the three powers concerned
should remain for ten years in the ratio of: Britain, 22; America, 18,
and Japan, 10. In other words, she proposed so to fix things that no two
of these three powers can wage a conclusive naval war against each
other, but with America and Britain in a position to do so jointly
against Japan and with Japan at a great disadvantage against America,
even if she were to risk an inconclusive war with America on the chance
of Britain’s not coming in. And having unfolded this scheme, Secretary
Hughes concluded.
We were a little stunned. We had expected the opening meeting to be
preliminary, to stick to generalities. After Secretary Hughes had
finished, there was a feeling that we wanted to go away and think. But
the members of the House of Representatives were enjoying an unwonted
sense of being in the gallery, quite irresponsibly in the gallery, with
somebody else upon the floor. They burst in upon our statesmanlike
thoughts below with loud cries for “Briand!”
The atmosphere of friendly festival was reestablished. M. Briand spoke
eloquently—saying nothing whatever about the proposals of Secretary
Hughes—and sat down, and his still quite abstract praises of peace were
translated into English.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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