Before the unfortunate affair at Fort Washington, it was my opinion, that the two armies, that on the east and that on the west side of the North River, must rest, each, on its own bottom; that the idea, of detaching and reënforcing from one side to the other, on every motion of the enemy, was chimerical; but to harbor such a thought, in our present circumstances, is absolute insanity.... We must therefore depend upon ourselves. Should the enemy alter the present direction of their operation, I would never entertain the thought on being succored from the western army (that across the Hudson, with Washington). Affairs appear in so important a crisis, that I think even the resolves of Congress must be no longer nicely weighed with us. There are times when we must commit treason against the laws of the State, for the salvation of the State. The present crisis demands this brave, _virtuous_ kind of treason. For my part, and I flatter myself my way of thinking is congenial with that of Mr. Bowdoin, I will stake my head and reputation on the measure. James Bowdoin loved Massachusetts; but no selfish or local considerations, such as were those of Lee, could impair his confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of the American Commander-in-Chief. The capture of Lee was thus mildly noticed by Washington: “It was by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he was taken.” General Sullivan succeeded to the command of Lee’s Division. Gates joined from the northern army, and on the twentieth of December, the Continental Army was reorganized for active service. General Howe had returned to New York December 20th. The British cantonments for the winter embraced Brunswick, Trenton, Burlington, Bordentown, and other places; with the Hessian, Donop, in command at Bordentown, and Rahl at Trenton. The month had been one of great strain upon the American Commander-in-Chief. He was, practically, on trial. The next in command, who, by virtue of previous military training, largely commanded public confidence, had failed him, simply because Washington, with the modesty of a true aspirant for excellence in his profession, would not pass judgment, and enforce his own will, in disobedience of the will of Congress. But, by this time Congress itself began to realize that a deliberate civil body was not the best Commander-in-Chief for field service, and that it would have to trust the men who did the fighting. It adjourned on the twelfth of December, quite precipitately, but _Resolved_ “That, until Congress shall otherwise order, General Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to the operations of war.”