In order rightly to measure the American War for Independence by fixed standards, it is both interesting and instructive to notice the systematic method adopted by Great Britain to suppress revolution and restore her supremacy over the revolting Colonies. The recovery of Boston was no longer to be seriously considered; but New England, as a strong and populous centre of disaffection, must still be so restricted through her coast exposure as to prevent her proportionate contribution to the Continental army at New York. If threatened from the north, New York also would be compelled to retain a large force of fully equipped militia for frontier defence. The occupation of Newport, R.I., which was only one day’s forced march from Boston, together with the patrol of Long Island Sound by ships-of-war, would therefore be positive factors in both limiting a draft and the transportation of troops from Massachusetts. If to this were added the control of the Hudson River, by a competent fleet, the whole of New England would be cut off from actively supporting the forces to be raised in the Middle Colonies. The fiery spirit and patriotic fervor of Virginia, as well as the lusty vigor of North Carolina and other Southern patriots, must also be subjected to a military surveillance and pressure from the sea, and thus, equally with New England, be deprived of a free and full contribution of its proper quota to the American army. The three sections named, using New York as the base of all British demonstrations in force, represented so many radiating belts, or zones, of military operation; and to secure ultimate British success, each of these zones must be so occupied in its own defence that a force from New York could be thrown with overwhelming effect upon each, in turn, and thus render it practically impossible for Washington to concentrate an effective army of resistance to each assailing column. To the southward, the waters of Delaware and Chesapeake bays, if once occupied by a sufficient fleet, would sever the lower Colonies from the American centre of service, as effectively as those of Long Island and the Hudson River would isolate New England. This was a sound military policy, and had been fully adopted so soon as Lord Howe received reënforcements and recovered breath after his severe punishment at Boston. The adoption of New York as the base of all British supply, as well as service, not only had its central and dominating site for the rendezvous, equipment, and despatch of troops, but through its auxiliary naval stations at Halifax and the West Indies, afforded opportunities for expeditions where large land forces were not required, and still keep such threatened localities under constant terror of assault. These considerations will have their better appreciation as the progress of the narrative unfolds successive campaigns.