_Sooner_ or _later_, in order to achieve absolute independence, and vanquish Great Britain in the fight, _the American army must so neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation by either army would cease to be the determining factor in the final result of the war_. The prestige of Great Britain was overshadowing; but could its arm reach the range of its shadow? Her fleets were many and mighty, but so were those of her jealous foes across the British Channel. Her armies in America must be adequate for operations in each of the zones mentioned, and be constantly supplied with munitions of war and every other accessory of successful field service. And, on the other hand, the American army, almost wholly dependent upon land transportation and hard marching, must have a correspondingly larger force, or fail to concentrate and fight upon equal terms with its adversary. The British Government having adopted a sound military policy, so soon as the object lessons of Lexington, Bunker Hill, and their expulsion from Boston unveiled their dull vision, did not fail to realize the necessity for an army strong enough to meet the full requirements of that policy. Forty regiments were assigned to the American service.[3] But the militia of New England had already driven twenty battalions (half the number) from its coast. Washington was no careless observer of European conditions, nor of the straitened nature of the British army organization, however superior to rivals on the sea. His deliberate conviction, ever a rallying force to his faith in deepest peril, that Britain could never spare more than one more army as large as the garrison of Boston, was the result of almost literal insight of the practical resources at her command. Hence, that Government contracted with petty European principalities for seventeen thousand men, for immediate delivery. These men were impressed and paid wages by their own local princes who speculated on the greater sums to be paid them, _per capita_, by Great Britain. The former estimate of General Gage, at twenty thousand men, and his significant hint as to the need of more than that force, was no longer ridiculed; but forty thousand was decided to be the minimum number required for the immediate prosecution of the war. Taking into account the foreign troops, the British ministry estimated as available for the American service a total, on paper, of fifty-five thousand men. To this was to be added, upon their hopeful estimate, four thousand Canadians, Indians, and royalists. Allowing for every possible shrinkage, on account of weakened regiments and other contingencies, the effective force was officially placed at forty thousand men. Footnote 3: See Appendix for regiments designated.