Ah, well, he took Wavre, licked his Thielman, extricated his army very cleverly from a most perilous position made for it by the disaster of Waterloo, got back into France in admirable shape, and had the satisfaction of knowing that he had made a record unique in the history of the world. As the man who did not do the thing he was sent to do, Grouchy has no peer. As a man who, in war, exemplified the adage of “penny wise and pound foolish,” Grouchy is unapproachable. As a man who,--by an almost miraculous union of inertness, stupidity, pig-headed obstinacy, complacent conceit, jealous pride, and inopportune wilfulness,--caused the last battle of the greatest soldier of all time to become the synonym for unbounded and irremediable disaster, Grouchy occupies a lofty, lonely pillar of his own--a sort of military Simeon Stylites. CHAPTER VIII WATERLOO Why had the Emperor been so late in getting into motion on the morning of the 16th? Why had he not started at five o’clock, and caught Zieten’s corps unsupported? Why did he give Blücher time to concentrate? Why did he not press the attack farther on the evening of the day when the Prussians were in full retreat? Why did he fail to give Grouchy the customary order to pursue with all the cavalry? Satisfactory answers cannot be made. That Napoleon’s conceptions were as grand as ever is apparent, but his failure in matters of detail is equally clear. Perhaps mental and physical weariness after several hours of sustained exertion and anxiety, furnish the most plausible explanation of these errors. At any rate, when he threw himself on his bed at Fluerus on the night of the 16th, Napoleon was worn out. Yet he did not know the true state of the Prussian army, nor what Ney had done at Quatre Bras. Soult sent no dispatches to Ney, and Ney sent none to Soult. The Emperor went to sleep _believing_ but not _knowing_ that Blücher had been so badly battered that it would take him at least two days to gather together the remnant of his army. More unfortunately still, Napoleon believed that the Prussians had taken up a line of retreat which would carry them beyond supporting distance of the English. To the contrary of both these convictions of the Emperor, the bulk of the Prussian army was preserving its formation, and Gneisenau, acting for Blücher, who was believed to be dead or a prisoner, had directed the retreat on Wavre. Thus the Prussians were keeping within supporting distance of the English, although this was not Gneisenau’s motive in issuing the order. He chose Wavre for the reason that at Wavre the separated corps of the army could best reunite. * * * * * The morning of the 17th of June dawns, and Napoleon has Wellington in his power. _But neither Wellington nor Napoleon knows it._ The Duke does not know what has become of the Prussians, and the Emperor does not know that the English are where he and Ney, acting in concert, can utterly destroy them.