Could the great soldier believe that his lieutenants, trained in his own school by years of service in the field, could manage so stupidly as to allow the Prussians to take him in flank, while he was giving battle to the English? Regarding the vexed question as to whether the order given to Grouchy was sufficient, a civilian can but say that it would seem that Grouchy ought to have known what was expected of him even if he had not been specially instructed. The very size of the army entrusted to him was enough to denote its purpose. The fact that Napoleon was going after Wellington and was sending Grouchy after Blücher said as plainly as words, “You take care of Blücher, while I take care of Wellington.” By necessary implication, the mere sending of Grouchy with 33,000 men after Blücher meant that Grouchy’s mission was to keep the Prussians off Napoleon while Napoleon was fighting the English. This was the common sense of it, and the Emperor had every reason to believe that no intelligent officer of his army could possibly understand it otherwise. Therefore, when he saw that Wellington meant to give battle, he felt the stern joy of the warrior who expects a fair fight and a brilliant victory. To Napoleon, a victory there meant even more. It meant the possible end of arduous warfare, an era of peace for France, the return to his arms of his son, and the crowning of his wonderful career by the continuation and completion of that system of internal improvements and beneficent institutions to which Europe owes so much. Therefore, when he plowed through the mud, drenched with rain, and went the rounds of his army posts, peering through the mists toward the English lines, listening for any sound of an army breaking camp to retreat, he was happy to be convinced, “They mean to fight.” No one could shake his belief that the Prussians had gone off toward Namur. That they had retired by a parallel line with the English was incredible. That Blücher would appear on the morrow, _and strike his flank within two hours after the signal for battle was fired_, was a thought which could not possibly have been driven into Napoleon’s head. In vain did his brother Jerome tell him of what a servant of the inn had overheard the English officers say, that very afternoon--that Blücher was to come to their aid the next day. Napoleon scouted the story. To his dying day, it is doubtful whether he believed that Wellington’s decision to stay and fight was based upon the practical certainty that Blücher would come to his aid. To that effect Blücher had given his promise--and Wellington knew that Blücher was not the man to make his ally a false promise to induce him to fight. Although Napoleon had slept but little on Saturday night (the 17th) and had been out in the rain and mud for hours making the rounds of his outposts, a distance of two miles, he seemed fresh and cheerful at breakfast, and chatted freely with his officers.