But the tide of public feeling in favor of “Constitutional money” kept on rising, and there is no doubt whatever that a majority of our people in 1896, favored Bi-metallism. But Bryan, cunning and ambitious, used his opportunities as a Bland delegate to undermine Bland, and at the psychological moment treated Bland to what Garfield had treated Sherman. What had Bryan done for Bi-metallism? Nothing. He did not even understand the true meaning of it. As for Bland, he had fought the battle of “Constitutional money” while Bryan was at school, and when, in the hour of Silver’s triumph, the hero of its struggle was cast aside by his ungrateful party, it broke the old man’s heart and he died. When I think of the long series of years during which Mr. Bland was the unflinching, untiring leader of the forces of Bi-metallism, and when I think of the very substantial fruits of his labors, the manner in which Bryan and the Democratic party flung him aside—the old horse turned out to graze till he should drop—seems to me to be one of the most convincing illustrations of the fact that “_politics is hell_.” Having captured the Democratic nomination, Bryan turned his attention to the Populists. They had proved that they could poll nearly two million votes. Bryan wanted them. Through Allen of Nebraska and Jones of Arkansas he laid his plans to get them. By as foul a trick as ever was played in American politics, the Populist Convention was inveigled into giving its Presidential nomination to Bryan. Having got what he sought, he broke the contract, turned a deaf ear to all appeals, underrated the measure of Mid-road Populist resentment, invaded “the enemy’s country,” cherished the delusion that he could win New England, hung on to the impossible Sewall, and so lost the Presidency. It is a fact that the Republicans had no hope of success, after the action of the Populist Convention, until Bryan himself adopted the insane policy of making the race with two Vice-Presidential candidates swinging on to the ticket. In that campaign, the whole money question was dwarfed to the discussion of “Free Silver.” The great issue of Constitutional, scientific Bi-metallism was shunted on to the spur track of Free Silver. In that campaign he lost the East and the North, irrevocably. Instead of making a strong, broad, easily understood plea for a restoration of the financial system of Jefferson, of Madison, of Monroe, of Jackson, of Benton, of Calhoun, he selected that detail of the money question which was of the least consequence, which was the most difficult to explain to the ordinary voter, and which,—on account of the selfish interests of the Silver Kings—lent itself most favorably to Republican assault.