Watson's Jeffersonian Magazine, (Vol. III, No. 1), January, 1909Various
History
Watson's Jeffersonian Magazine, (Vol. III, No. 1), January, 1909
Various
United States -- Politics and government -- Periodicals
It must be, then, as chief magistrate of the republic that he won the
title of “great.” That, in fact, is the case. He was a great chief
executive. As such, he deserves immortality. Because he sealed his
work with his life-blood, his memory will always be sacred. But, is
it absolutely certain that no other American would have succeeded in
piloting the vessel of state through the storm of the Civil War? Is
it quite certain that Stephen A. Douglas, himself, would not have
succeeded where Mr. Lincoln succeeded? Who knows and can dogmatically
say that Thaddeus Stevens or Oliver Morton, or Zach Chandler, or Ben
Wade could not have done it? What was it that Mr. Lincoln did during
the Civil War that was so much greater and grander than what might have
been expected from Andrew Jackson in the same crisis? Somehow I fail
to see it. He did not lose courage, but there were brave men before
Agamemnon, and the world has never been lacking in heroic types that
stand forth and meet emergencies.
In studying Mr. Lincoln’s course during the Civil War we can discover
a great deal of patience, a great deal of tact, a great deal of
diplomacy, a great deal of determination to win, a great deal of
consecration to patriotic duty. He struck the right key-note when he
said that he was fighting not to free the negroes but to preserve the
Union. This insight into the situation which enabled him to take the
strongest possible position showed political genius of a high order.
This alone would entitle him to be classed as a great statesman, a
great chief magistrate, a great national leader.
When we calmly reflect upon what he had to do, and the means which
were at his command for doing it, we see nothing in the result that
borders upon the miraculous. All the advantage was on his side. The
fire-eaters of the South played into his hands beautifully. They were
so very blind to what was necessary for their success that they even
surrendered possession of Washington City, when they might just as
well have held it and rushed their troops to it, thus making sure not
only of Baltimore, but of the whole State of Maryland—to say nothing
of the enormous moral advantage of holding possession of the capital
of the nation. It was a clever strategy which, while talking peace,
adopted those measures which compelled the Confederate authorities
to fire upon the flag at Fort Sumter. But that most effective bit of
strategy appears to have had its birth in the fertile brain of William
H. Seward. The diplomacy which kept dangling before the eyes of the
border states the promise to pay for the slaves until the necessity of
duping the waverers had passed, was clever in its way; but there is
no evidence that the fine Italian hand of Mr. Seward was not in this
policy also.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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