the exercise of the discretion with which they were entrusted, in separating the different charges, or in selecting one prisoner, and postponing another, according to the circumstances of the case. The question then was, whether the prisoners would suffer prejudice in going to trial with the libel as it now stood. And, in considering this, it would be observed that it was not charged that there was any natural connection between the crimes committed. There was certainly none in law; and with the exception of the mode of the murder and the intent, there was not the slightest pretence for saying there was any connection between them. But the intent was not laid absolutely and peremptorily. It was conditional: “Either you committed these acts with the wicked, aforethought purpose and intent of selling the bodies to the surgeons for dissection, or with some other purpose or intent to the Prosecutor unknown.” This indeed would compel the Prosecutor to prove that the murder was committed for the purpose of handing over the bodies to dissection; but he might also bring in under it a very different purpose or object, as, for example, that it was done for the purpose of robbery, or to gratify private revenge. In the major proposition, however, there was no aggravation; and it was not said that there had been any conspiracy, that these murders were part of a system; they were laid as three unconnected offences, committed at different times and at different places. Now he prayed their Lordships to keep in mind that murder was not like any of the other offences which usually occurred in the practice of the Supreme Criminal Court; it was one which, in every case, when brought home to a pannel, was visited with the highest punishment of the law; and therefore it differed from all the offences to which it was sometimes likened, and required greater caution on the part of those by whom it was to be tried. As applicable to the case of Burke, however, three murders were charged; and this charge was calculated in the most serious degree to prejudice him. Each specific offence, it might be said, would require to be supported by its own specific evidence; but it was impossible to find any jury so dispassionate as not to borrow some light from the one to enable them to decide on the other; it was impossible for the jury to separate the evidence in one case from that in another; it was impossible that one murder not proved could be separated from any light thrown upon it by another not proved; nay, though neither the one nor the other might be proved, it might still be held, that upon the whole, from the massing or blending of unconnected acts, enough was made out to warrant a conviction. And all this was aggravated by the prejudice arising from the manner in which the alleged murders were said to have been committed, and in regard to which so strong a degree of excitement existed in the public mind. Then observe the