yet it was a very different one from murder. No case of the latter was indeed quoted. The author treated merely of connected crimes, as robbery and murder. But no injury was done by such accumulation. They were parts of the same foul and atrocious proceeding, and they had a natural and necessary dependence. But in the present case there was no natural dependence, and not even an allegation that the prisoners were connected. He then proceeded to the consideration of heterogenous charges, as of murder and of theft. Some of these, he said, were not cases to be followed at the present day: and he instanced that of Walter Buchanan, who was accused of ten different crimes in one libel; namely, fire-raising, attempts at fire-raising, attempts to poison, theft, reset of theft, the harbouring, out-hounding, and maintaining of thieves and robbers, sorning and levying black mail, and killing and eating of other people’s sheep. Here, however, the Lords restricted the trial to the more special charges. He now came to the principle, and mentioned a case in 1784, when the Lord Advocate did depart from several of the charges. In regard to accumulation of parties, Mr. Hume put a case of several persons being called to answer in one libel for the same fact; but then, observe the remedy. “On any occasion when they see cause, especially if it appear that the Prosecutor meant to lay the pannels under this disadvantage (he begged to disclaim any insinuation that such was the intention of the Prosecutor in the present instance,) the Court may and will separate the trials of the several culprits, and send those to an assize, in the first place, by themselves, who are meant to be called as witnesses for the others,” vol. ii. p. 170. The learned Counsel then proceeded to the third sort of _cumulatio actionum_, that of charging several persons in the same libel with separate and unconnected offences, and contended very ably that the case before the Court fell under this description. In conclusion, he referred to the English practice as illustrative of the principle for which he had been contending, and referred to a decision of Lord Ellenborough, as reported in Campbell, vol. ii. p. 131, and also to the authority of Chitty, vol. i. p. 252. By the law of England, two felonies may be combined in one charge against two separate prisoners; but it is usual for the Judge, in his discretion, to call upon the prosecutor to make his election, and to proceed with a specific charge against one individual. In point of law they may be combined, but the judges in their discretion separate them; and for this reason among others, that the combination would prejudice prisoners in their challenge of the jury.