In weighing the second point it would be wrong to assume that the Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable consequence. If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M. de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and it may be safely assumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose. The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a decade--the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited assertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual Alliance would have survived the shock. Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in Germany as a man of peace--_the_ man who had prevented the Balkan War from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same nation of being the originator of the world war. Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey initiated only two members of the Cabinet--Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane--into the details of the agreement with France, and these three gentlemen he refers to as the "inner circle." King Edward, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy, succeeded in harnessing the _revanche idée_ and the spirit of Russian aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France, Oncken remarks: "The declaration was just as true formally as it was a lie in essentials." [Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G. B. Shaw and the _Labour Leader_.--Author.]