Following the development of events after the conference proposal had been dropped, Oncken writes: "Meanwhile the Russian Government endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this false conception, _i.e._, openly joining Russia and France. "It is noteworthy how quickly Grey assimilated this train of thought. Disregarding the suggestions of the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning England's eventual attitude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to energetic measures. "But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia. On the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands--and in truth with England's co-operation--to such a degree that their acceptance would have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy. "And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision (mobilization). The certainty which she had gained from the moves of English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France's support and with it England's, turned the scale--against peace. "That this calculation was decisive for Russia's change of front is confirmed by a witness whose impartiality even our opponents will admit."[202] [Footnote 202: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 553-4.] Professor Oncken then supports his argument with quotations from a letter written by the Belgian Legation Secretary in St. Petersburg to his Government. The letter was doubtless stolen while in transit by the Berlin postal authorities. Monsieur B. de l'Escaille wrote the letter on July 30th, despatched it by courier to Berlin, where it was posted on the following day. The outside envelope was addressed to Madame Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles; inside was a letter addressed to M. Darignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. German writers state that no letters were forwarded to foreign countries after martial law was proclaimed on July 31st (a statement which is untrue), thus it fell into their hands.