Knight, p. 101. Footnote 17: Schasler, p. 316. Footnote 18: Knight, pp. 102-104. Footnote 19: R. Kralik, p. 124. Footnote 20: Spaletti, Schasler, p. 328. Footnote 21: Schasler, pp. 331-333. Footnote 22: Schasler, pp. 525-528. Footnote 23: Knight, pp. 61-63. Footnote 24: Schasler, pp. 740-743. Footnote 25: Schasler, pp. 769-771. Footnote 26: Schasler, pp. 786, 787. Footnote 27: Kralik, p. 148. Footnote 28: Kralik, p. 820. Footnote 29: Schasler, pp. 828, 829, 834-841. Footnote 30: Schasler, p. 891. Footnote 31: Schasler, p. 917. Footnote 32: Schasler, pp. 946, 1085, 984, 985, 990. Footnote 33: Schasler, pp. 966, 655, 956. Footnote 34: Schasler, p. 1017. Footnote 35: Schasler, pp. 1065, 1066. Footnote 36: Schasler, pp. 1097-1100. Footnote 37: Schasler, pp. 1124, 1107. Footnote 38: Knight, pp. 81, 82. Footnote 39: Knight, p. 83. Footnote 40: Schasler, p. 1121. Footnote 41: Knight, pp. 85, 86. Footnote 42: Knight, p. 88. Footnote 43: Knight, p. 88. Footnote 44: Knight, p. 112. Footnote 45: Knight, p. 116. Footnote 46: Knight, pp. 118, 119. Footnote 47: Knight, pp. 123, 124. Footnote 48: _La philosophie en France_, p. 232. Footnote 49: _Du fondement de l’induction._ Footnote 50: _Philosophie de l’art_, vol. i. 1893, p. 47. Footnote 51: Knight, p. 139-141. Footnote 52: Knight, pp. 134. Footnote 53: _L’esthétique_, p. 106. Footnote 54: Knight, p. 238. Footnote 55: Knight, pp. 239, 240. Footnote 56: Knight, pp. 240-243. Footnote 57: Knight, pp. 250-252. Footnote 58: Knight, pp. 258, 259. Footnote 59: Knight, p. 243. CHAPTER IV To what do these definitions of beauty amount? Not reckoning the thoroughly inaccurate definitions of beauty which fail to cover the conception of art, and which suppose beauty to consist either in utility, or in adjustment to a purpose, or in symmetry, or in order, or in proportion, or in smoothness, or in harmony of the parts, or in unity amid variety, or in various combinations of these,—not reckoning these unsatisfactory attempts at objective definition, all the æsthetic definitions of beauty lead to two fundamental conceptions. The first is that beauty is something having an independent existence (existing in itself), that it is one of the manifestations of the absolutely Perfect, of the Idea, of the Spirit, of Will, or of God; the other is that beauty is a kind of pleasure received by us, not having personal advantage for its object.