O.M. The others offer you a hundred bribes to be good, thus conceding that the Master inside of you must be conciliated and contented first, and that you will do nothing at _first hand _but for his sake; then they turn square around and require you to do good for _other’s _sake _chiefly_; and to do your duty for duty’s _sake_, chiefly; and to do acts of _self_-_sacrifice_. Thus at the outset we all stand upon the same ground—recognition of the supreme and absolute Monarch that resides in man, and we all grovel before him and appeal to him; then those others dodge and shuffle, and face around and unfrankly and inconsistently and illogically change the form of their appeal and direct its persuasions to man’s _second-place _powers and to powers which have _no existence _in him, thus advancing them to _first _place; whereas in my Admonition I stick logically and consistently to the original position: I place the Interior Master’s requirements _first_, and keep them there. Y.M. If we grant, for the sake of argument, that your scheme and the other schemes aim at and produce the same result—_right living—_has yours an advantage over the others? O.M. One, yes—a large one. It has no concealments, no deceptions. When a man leads a right and valuable life under it he is not deceived as to the _real _chief motive which impels him to it—in those other cases he is. Y.M. Is that an advantage? Is it an advantage to live a lofty life for a mean reason? In the other cases he lives the lofty life under the _impression _that he is living for a lofty reason. Is not that an advantage? O.M. Perhaps so. The same advantage he might get out of thinking himself a duke, and living a duke’s life and parading in ducal fuss and feathers, when he wasn’t a duke at all, and could find it out if he would only examine the herald’s records. Y.M. But anyway, he is obliged to do a duke’s part; he puts his hand in his pocket and does his benevolences on as big a scale as he can stand, and that benefits the community. O.M. He could do that without being a duke. Y.M. But would he? O.M. Don’t you see where you are arriving? Y.M. Where? O.M. At the standpoint of the other schemes: That it is good morals to let an ignorant duke do showy benevolences for his pride’s sake, a pretty low motive, and go on doing them unwarned, lest if he were made acquainted with the actual motive which prompted them he might shut up his purse and cease to be good? Y.M. But isn’t it best to leave him in ignorance, as long as he _thinks _he is doing good for others’ sake? O.M. Perhaps so. It is the position of the other schemes. They think humbug is good enough morals when the dividend on it is good deeds and handsome conduct. Y.M. It is my opinion that under your scheme of a man’s doing a good deed for his _own _sake first-off, instead of first for the _good deed’s _sake, no man would ever do one. O.M. Have you committed a benevolence lately? Y.M. Yes. This morning. O.M. Give the particulars.