conditions, would be beyond the reach of our intellectual powers, and beyond our reflective thought. We may justly say that it is beyond the reach of any powers that are merely of reflective thought. Not thus does intellect carry on its conceptual work. It analyses and reflects, it separates, compares, and puts together. That is not the way of the grub of Sitaris, neither is it the way of the solitary wasp. There appears to be for these and for others of their tribe, in 'perceptual consciousness,' some mysterious sympathy between the life of the creature using and the life of the creature used, akin to that sympathy of digestive secretions with digestible food by means of which our bodies are nourished, or the process by which the cell becomes the organized and completed creature. There seem to be also motor-habits stored up by repetition in forbears, which facilitate the active expression of this sympathy. When the wasp stings the nerve-centres of the caterpillar as accurately, as on the whole he does, it seems to us as though in the mere presence together of wasp and caterpillar two congruous activities, not two beings, met—the wasp-activity perceiving rather than thinking about the caterpillar-activity, perceiving it and attacking it through certain established instrumental means as though entering into a familiar relation to it. You might be inclined to say that the sting of the wasp picks out the nervous ganglia of the caterpillar as a magnet picks out fragments of steel from the dust. Instinct no doubt means perceiving in sympathetic relation, and has more than a mere likeness to reflex actions in the body. Like these it may find its bodily support in a motor tradition, borne from reproductive germ to reproductive germ, as a structural record of bodily movements ingrained by the incessant repetition of certain actions through many continuous generations. But unlike these it may work with and for the intellect in all its grades.