Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
History
Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)
University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
World War, 1914-1918
That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some years
past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also a
matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan would
involve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the duty
was supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of the
French opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The
plea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealt
the Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who are
either ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casual
conversation all over England these last three years; and Sir Edward
Grey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what the
consequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he
informed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do
not expect our neutrality'.[9] There has been no secret about it
whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of the
Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th should
have been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation or
misinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of the
thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis the
military situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quite
well what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on our
part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have been
expressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to the
shoulders of Great Britain.
This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to the
ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology.
Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peace
that we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join the
French on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offered
by Liège, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause.
For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what was
tantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of
Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.
Notes:
[Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid. 304.]
[Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, _The Hague Peace
Conferences_, pp. 281-9.]
[Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, _Map of Europe
by Treaty_, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]
[Footnote 5: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, (Cd.
7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2.]
[Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. iii,
p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of _Prussia_ of Collective Guarantee by
Powers of Neutrality of _Luxemburg_, London, 7th May, 1867.']
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