Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
History
Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)
University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
World War, 1914-1918
diplomatic support to the other in executing the clauses relative to
Egypt and Morocco.[21] Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 and 4) related
to Spain, defining the territory which she was to receive 'whenever the
Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,' and providing that the
Anglo-French agreement would hold good even if Spain declined this
arrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Government found
itself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify its policy
in respect to Egypt or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and
seventh Articles of the public declaration would remain intact; that is,
each would under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial
liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and the
Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming any
intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial
organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian
legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and France
agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from making similar
reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the Egyptian national
debt.
Notes:
[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's _Bismarck_, p. 444.]
[Footnote 11: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_ (Cd.
7467), No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See
_infra_, Appendix II.]
[Footnote 12: For these agreements see _The Times_, April 12, 1904, and
November 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter.]
[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 (1906).]
[Footnote 14: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M.
Cambon, November 22, 1912. See Appendix II.]
[Footnote 15: _Correspondence_, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
July 29, 1914.]
[Footnote 16: _Times_, July 7, 1911.]
[Footnote 17: _Times_, July 27, 1911.]
[Footnote 18: _Times_, July 22, 1911.]
[Footnote 19: _Correspondence_, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See
Appendix II.]
[Footnote 20: _Ibid_. p. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105).]
[Footnote 21: _Times_, April 12, 1904.]
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynastic
connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy of
repression of Polish nationality--the fatal legacy of the days of
Frederic the Great and Catharine II--united the two empires. National
sentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as
1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away from
Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy left
the Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked on
Balkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her
side turned to new allies.
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