Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
History
Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)
University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
World War, 1914-1918
No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28,
the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the
southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July
29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that
she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these
assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to
have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and
Austria-Hungary.
Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly
settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for
peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and
July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian
mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military
preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim
'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measure
to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July
30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus
indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia
that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against
both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that
her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and
would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian
frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the
southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the
'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of
mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or
professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not
proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47]
On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in
progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31,
Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each
took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding
that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France
asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany
and Russia.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account