AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, _succ_. 1848. _Foreign Secretary_: Count Berchtold. _Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Maurice de Bunsen. _Russia_: M. Schebesco. M. Kondachev (_Charge d'Affaires_). _France_: M. Crozier. _Germany_: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Bögendorff. ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, _succ_. 1900. _Foreign Secretary_: Marquis di San Giuliano. _Ambassador from Great Britain_: Sir Rennell Rodd. BELGIUM: King Albert, _succ_. 1909. _Minister of Great Britain_: Sir Francis Villiers. SERVIA: King Peter, _succ_. 1903. _Minister of Great Britain_: C.L. des Graz. D.M. Crackanthorpe (_First Secretary_). _Russian Chargé d'Affaires_: M. Strandtmann. I _Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia_. From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57] Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia'.[59] After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military action in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia'.[60] At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria in the Servian business:-- 'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61] M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this policy of Germany pretty soon:-- 'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62] When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion thus:--