The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the 'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of paper' of 1839 would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's desperate bid for neutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government had counted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeply disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour to bargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peace between Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their origin must be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom we believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the war broke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour of European peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German hierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that Sir Edward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on July 31, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.'[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sent out from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customs authorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detaining British ships,[127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar from British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was made twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominous statement that 'no information was to be had'.[128]