Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
History
Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)
University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
World War, 1914-1918
Powers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies....
England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of
annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended natural
right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political system
of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent
of all the Powers'.[2]
This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an
attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of Western
Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the same
grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, a
commercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzerland, where she
had no immediate interests to protect. By the Treaty of Lunéville
(February, 1801) France and Austria had mutually guaranteed the
independence of the Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch to
adopt whatever form of government seemed good to them. In defiance of
these stipulations Napoleon maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced
upon her a new Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November,
1801). Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic
and had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that the
French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which Napoleon
replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. His interview
with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many points of
resemblance with the now famous interview of August 4, 1914, between Sir
Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, like
the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed himself unable,
to understand why Great Britain should insist upon the observance of
treaties.
To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars that
Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect themselves or
the German people against an aggressive French Government. The allies
therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to Holland the Austrian
Netherlands and the bishopric of Liège in order 'to put Holland in a
position to resist attack until the Powers could come to its aid'. This
arrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was
no government or visible unity in the Belgian provinces after the
retirement of the French, the union with Holland, originally suggested
by Lord Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the
great privilege of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at
the Congress of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands
was declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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