“In the case of Porto Rico, where the people have as yet expressed no desire for independent government, we might with propriety declare our willingness to annex the island, if the citizens desire annexation, but the Philippines are too far away and their people too different from ours to be annexed to the United States, even if they desired it.” In making this statement, and in his subsequent active support of the treaty, Mr. Bryan’s course was again opposed to the wishes and advice of many of his close political friends. In fact, before Mr. Bryan took his firm stand probably the majority of Democratic leaders in and out of Congress were opposed to the ratification of the treaty because of its Philippine clause. But Mr. Bryan, while as strongly opposed to this clause as anyone, was anxious to see the war finally ended. He knew that for the Senate to reject the treaty would prolong the war perhaps a year or more, and, further, that it might lead to endless and unpleasant complications. Once the war was ended, he held, the American people themselves could dispose of the Philippine question. Largely owing to the aid extended the administration by Mr. Bryan, the treaty was ratified by the Senate. Those senators who were opposed to the imperial policy of President McKinley supported the “Bacon resolution” as a declaration of this nation’s purpose toward the Philippines and Filipinos. This resolution declared: “The United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people.” The Democratic policy, as outlined by Mr. Bryan, was the support of the treaty and of the foregoing resolution. The treaty was ratified, but the resolution, though supported by practically the solid Democratic, Populist, and Silver Republican strength in the Senate, and by a number of Republican senators who were opposed to the imperial policy, was defeated by the deciding vote of Vice-President Hobart. Had the resolution been adopted, and the Philippines been given the same promise of independence and self-government as had already been given Cuba, it is believed that the long, bloody, and costly war in the Philippine Islands might have been averted, and the abandoned old-world heresy of the right of one man to rule another without that other’s consent would not now have regained a footing on the soil of the great American Republic.