Disputes now began between Puisaye and Hervilly, the former desiring to push on boldly, while the latter insisted on remaining in the peninsula. Time was thus given for the republican general, Hoche, to collect his forces and make spirited attacks upon the invaders, who soon fell a prey to schism and discouragement. The doom of the expedition was decided by the treacherous surrender of the fort to Hoche's men at the close of a night attack (21st July). As day dawned the Republicans drove their foes into the peninsula. Wild scenes of panic ensued. A storm having compelled the larger British warships to keep in the offing, Puisaye went off in a boat to beg succour from Admiral Warren. The defence speedily collapsed. De Sombreuil, who was left in command near the tip of the tongue of land, unaccountably surrendered, though a British corvette, the "Lark," and gunboats were effectively covering his flank. At the instigation of Tallien, the French Convention disavowed the promise of its officers at Quiberon to spare the lives of those who laid down their arms; and 712 Royalists were shot down in cold blood at Auray and neighbouring places. The evidence proves that the Pitt Ministry had done its best for this expedition, which went to pieces owing to the quarrels of its leaders and the refusal of Charette to stir a finger on behalf of Puisaye, whom he detested. For the final massacre Tallien and the French Convention are wholly responsible. Yet it suited the tactics of the English Opposition to accuse Pitt of planning the death of the French Royalists. Fox, in one of his wildest outbreaks, charged Ministers with deliberately sending noble gentlemen to a massacre. Sheridan, too, declared that, though British blood had not flowed, yet "British honour had bled at every pore." These reckless mis-statements have been refuted by the testimony of La Jaille, Vauban, and Puisaye, royalist officers who escaped. Before these horrible events were known in England, Ministers prepared to succour the vanguard at Quiberon. News that Spain had made peace with France in a highly suspicious manner weakened this second effort, it being necessary to safeguard the British West Indies from a probable attack by the Spaniards. As no more than four newly raised British regiments could be spared for the Biscay coast, the Earl of Moira threw up the command, which General Doyle then accepted. It seems probable that by 3rd August Pitt doubted the expediency of sending a second expedition to Brittany or la Vendee. Nevertheless, the Comte d'Artois, who about that time arrived at Spithead from North Germany with a force of _emigres_, desired to make the venture, relying on Charette, and other royalist chiefs who had once more aroused the men of the West. The Count also cherished the hope that the numerous bands of malcontents in Paris would overthrow that tottering Government.