World War, 1914-1918 -- Personal narratives, English; World War, 1914-1918 -- Russia (Federation) -- Siberia
"1. All enemy attacks were driven back to-day. We gained two
machine guns and five captives.
"2. The Allied troops will attack the enemy, inflicting upon
them an annihilating disaster, to-morrow, August 24.
"3. The Japanese troops will attack the enemy, starting the
present line, at 3 o'clock, the 24th, morning.
"4. The reserve British, French, Kalmakoff's forces, and a few
Japanese companies will be under the command of Japanese. Colonel
Inagaki will arrive at the north-western side of Dukoveskoie at
2 o'clock to-morrow morning.
"(Signed) S. OIE,
Lieut.-General,
Commanding 12th Division."
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF DUKOVESKOIE AND KRAEVESK
I Looked at my watch, and called the Japanese officer's attention to the
fact that the time was 1.45 A.M., and that Dukoveskoie was four miles
distant. Although he could speak perfect English, he held out his hand
and with a profound bow pretended not to understand the point of my
observation. It was in point of time simply impossible to arouse the
British, Czech, Cossack and Japanese detachments and march four miles in
the middle of the night in fifteen minutes; but I had lived long enough
in the East to know that the Oriental never sets a European impossible
tasks without a good reason from his own point of view. I dispatched
orderlies to each detachment with definite instructions to be ready to
move at once. The Japanese refused to move or even get out of their
tents. The Czechs were enjoying a much-needed rest, and refused to
budge, while Kalmakoff's Cossacks remained asleep beside their horses.
Ataman Kalmakoff was at Vladivostok, and his second in command was
dismissed on his return for refusing to obey my orders, as the Ataman
was most anxious that his men should be always in the fighting line
wherever it might be. Captain Clark, M.C., reported the 25th Middlesex
as ready to march, transport and all complete, twenty-five minutes
after receiving the order.
To make doubly sure there was no mistake, I called personally upon the
Japanese officer, who point-blank refused either to arouse or move his
men in accordance with his own Headquarters' order. I am bound to admit
that from that moment I had a suspicion that the order of General Oie
was so much Japanese camouflage, and that it was not intended that we
should take any part in the immediate operations. I also determined to
frustrate this attempt to exclude the Allies from participation, and
gave the order to my own men to move.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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