World War, 1914-1918 -- Personal narratives, English; World War, 1914-1918 -- Russia (Federation) -- Siberia
"2. On the 27th the enemy continued their retreat to the north of the
River Ussurie, and no enemy could be seen to the south of it, though
nine railway bridges out of ten between Shmakovka and Ussurie had been
destroyed. Damage done is some ten metres each, and a few days would be
required to repair them. The Ussurie railway bridge is not damaged, and
on the night of the 26th, after a small detachment had occupied it, one
company of infantry reinforced. Against the enemy on Lake Hanka, which
was known to have gone down the river with gunboats, one company of
infantry has been dispatched to the right bank of Ussurie east of
Shmakovka.
"3. The Division remains at the present position, and prepares to move
forward on the 28th."
This completed the Ussurie operations, for the battle was absolutely
decisive. The enemy were entirely demoralised, and never made another
stand east of Lake Baikal.
CHAPTER V
JAPANESE METHODS AND ALLIED FAR-EASTERN POLICY
The Japanese, for their own peculiar reasons, as will have already
appeared, had decided in the early stages of the operations that the
maritime provinces were their special preserve. They looked with the
greatest suspicion upon the forces and efforts of the other Allies,
especially British and American, and by their orders tried deliberately
to exclude them from their counsels and as far as possible from the
administration of the territory recovered from the Terrorists. The 27th
Battalion of American Infantry had landed at Vladivostok a few days
before the battle of Dukoveskoie, and promises were made that they
should be hurried forward to take a share in the fighting; but the
Japanese, who controlled the railway, saw to it that they arrived a day
late. Instead of pushing them ahead, they were detrained at Svagena, and
then entrained again from day to day, always about fifty versts behind
the Japanese front. In addition the Japanese never trusted their Allies.
No order to the Japanese Army was ever given to the Allied commanders
until the operation had been carried out or had got to such a stage as
to make it impossible for them to take part or offer suggestions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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