Another great soldier who left his mark, but in a different way, was Lord Kitchener. His reforms were sweeping. The training of the Army received at his hands an impetus which will stamp his rule as remarkable so long as we remain in India. His re-grouping of brigades and divisions, the creation of a General Staff, the erection of new barracks and cantonments, quite upset the slow calculations of those who looked on and wondered. And yet if analysed his work was only a putting into force of principles which had long been recognised as necessary but which others had not had the power to carry out. Lord Kitchener with a master eye saw what was needed and did it; he rode rough shod over _dustoor_ or custom; he was a mighty organiser and the civilians were afraid of him. He never bothered himself over minor details in India; he left them to his subordinates. He chose them himself and trusted them. The inside life of Indians was unknown to him, he went to India too late in life to learn; he was too busy with big tasks to attend to what he did not consider an essential for a Commander-in-Chief. Among his many reforms were some which I venture to say have not been beneficial. The terms of service which passed men to the Reserve after a short period in the ranks proved a veritable stumbling-block, and created a Reserve which proved not only useless but a danger in war time. The Reservists sent to the Indian Corps in France were of this type, largely worn out, hating the very idea of war, many physically unfit and incapable of a single day’s work. Even Lord Kitchener had found it hard to get sanction for sufficient British officers for Indian regiments and battalions. The numbers eventually sanctioned were sufficient for frontier work, but altogether inadequate to meet the requirements of European warfare, and this very soon made itself manifest. The reduction of ambulance _kahars_ (trained bearers) was another very serious drawback, but in this case it reacted worse on the Frontiers than in Europe, for in France, of course, a totally different system prevailed. In 1908, during the Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expeditions, in order to equip even one division and an extra brigade, bearers had to be collected from all the divisions in India as far as Madras; an impossible system in an Army supposed to stand ready for Frontier wars. During Lord Kitchener’s rule, manœuvres or large gatherings of troops were few and far between; all the money available was spent on reorganisation; nevertheless the battalion training reached a far higher scale of efficiency than had ever previously been the case. In order to increase the numbers of brigades and divisions, to meet the requirements of his scheme for mobilisation, Lord Kitchener reduced the number of British battalions in a brigade from two to one. This for European warfare proved a great mistake, as I shall endeavour to show.