The endeavour displayed by the Infantry in the various assaults left nothing to be desired. The successive attempts to reach the enemy trenches were brought to a standstill by the disablement of all but a small percentage of the assaulting columns, and by machine-gun and rifle fire. This fire started from the moment the first of our men showed above our breastworks, and numbers were put out of action within a few yards of our own front line. Of those who succeeded, in spite of the heaviest losses, in getting out half-way between our lines and the Germans, the small number of unwounded men found themselves pinned to the ground, unable to advance or retire in face of the enemy’s fire. The casualties suffered on the 9th and 10th May were heavy, amounting to sixty-eight British officers, thirty Indian officers, and a total of all ranks, British and Indian, of over 2000, or about thirty-six per cent of strength. On the 10th May General Anderson came to my Headquarters, and I communicated to him an order I had received, and which stated that it was vitally important not a round of gun ammunition should be wasted. At this interview I told him that no attack would take place on the 10th or night 10th-11th, but that one might take place on the night 11th-12th. That evening the Garhwal Brigade took over some 230 yards’ extra front from the British Division on our right in anticipation of the attack. The Sirhind Brigade was ordered back from Croix Barbée, and again came under the orders of the Lahore Division, while the Dehra Dun Brigade was replaced at the disposal of the Meerut Division. On the morning of 12th May the situation was as follows: the Garhwal Brigade held the line, the Bareilly Brigade was in support with Headquarters at Lansdowne Post, and the Dehra Dun Brigade in Divisional reserve at La Couture and Vieille Chapelle. I informed the G.O.C. Meerut Division that his Division, less the Dehra Dun Brigade and with the Sirhind Brigade added, would probably attack on a 300 yards’ front on the night 13th-14th May, in co-operation with the First Corps on its right, the front of attack being between two points designated V 5 and V 6, well known to us all. I have since I first wrote this visited (1919) this bit of ground and located my friends V 5 and V 6, and I touched my hat not only to the brave men who died for us, but also to the German dead who held them so tenaciously and died like gentlemen.