My own part in the Great War ended early in September 1915, and the share taken by the Indian Corps as part of the Army which attacked at and north of Loos (prior to its final departure from France) can only be told as I have gathered it from records and letters received by me; but my information is derived from the most authentic sources and may be taken as absolutely correct. I should not consider this book complete without giving in some detail an account of the last, but by no means the least, of the fights waged by the Indians in Flanders. More especially do I deem it an honour to do this, as the command had devolved, on my own recommendation, on my friend, Lieut.-General Sir Charles Anderson, K.C.B., one of the most earnest fighting soldiers. Moreover, certain Indian battalions took part in it which had joined just prior to, or immediately after, my departure. Like every other unit of the Corps, I had known and served with them in India, and it is a source of pleasure to record, as far as I can in a bald statement of facts, the part they played in the closing scenes of the drama of the soldiers of Hindustan. I had been partly instrumental in making the preliminary preparations for this battle, and therefore am in a position to understand thoroughly what occurred. The events as they actually took place have convinced those who knew what was being done that the task assigned to the Indian Corps was, under the circumstances, a hopeless one, unless the wind and weather were both favourable for the use of gas, of which we understood but little at that time. I had originally selected as the objective of the Corps the very same front it finally attacked, and had laid my plans before the Army Commander. A German deserter had, however, come in and stated that his own side was preparing a gas attack on the self-same front, and I had been ordered to select another portion of the German line on which to direct our assault. Later, a heavy fire had been kept up to detect if possible whether there was any collection of gas cylinders or apparatus in the vicinity; the deserter’s report had been found to be untrue and I had been ordered to hold to my original plan again; but as the operation depended mainly on the successful use of gas, I had made certain suggestions in case of a failure of cylinders, or an ill turn of luck in wind and weather at the last moment. Those who may read this story will at least see that my ideas were not only not groundless, but that, as I had deemed possible, the supply of gas was eventually merely a trifle of what had been planned—160 cylinders instead of the 1100 calculated—and of the 160 in the trenches only 30 could be discharged before the wind veered. The gas, moreover, had no effect on the enemy, as was proved after our first advance, whilst it very seriously hampered our own troops.