The end of a year of trench warfare, and the deterioration of Indian units as compared with our original battalions, was not the time to call on them to carry out such an attack, unless they were to be amply supported by guns, and of these I was very short. Given these and favourable conditions for the use of gas, much might have been done which the shortage of the former and handicap (as it turned out) of the latter made an impossible task. It is true that the push was only a subsidiary one, and designed to hold the enemy in its front and thus prevent him from sending assistance farther south; but distinct objectives had been assigned; and, even so, there is reason in all things, and in my opinion, as originally designed and as we were supposed to carry it out, there was not the slightest chance of our gaining our objective or retaining it if gained, whilst there was the certainty of very heavy losses amongst men who had already cheerfully made immense sacrifices for Great Britain. I will not enter into the operations of the British Army as a whole; suffice it to say that the First Army assumed the offensive on September the 25th, and the orders for the attack of the Indian Corps, amongst others, were based on the following instructions: The Army Corps south of the La Bassée Canal were to advance eastward to the line Pont-à-Vendin-Bauvin. The Corps north of the Canal were to engage the enemy vigorously and to prevent him from withdrawing troops for a counter-attack. Wherever the enemy gave ground he was to be followed up with the greatest energy. The Second Division was to assault the enemy’s trenches at Givenchy and to attack Canteleux; the Third Corps to assault the enemy’s line near Bridoux with a view to eventually effecting a junction on the Aubers Ridge with the Indian Corps. The Indian Corps was to capture the enemy’s trenches in the vicinity of the Moulin du Piètre and to take advantage of any weakening of the enemy on its front, so as to secure the high ground about Haut Pommereau and La Cliqueterie Ferme. The attack was to be made by the Meerut Division, then commanded by Major-General Jacob, promoted from Brigadier Dehra Dun Brigade. The first objective was to secure and consolidate a line of a road which ran through Mauquissart to an enemy salient. Every opportunity was to be seized of pushing farther forward to gain the high ground about La Cliqueterie Ferme. Detailed orders were also issued for the Lahore and Nineteenth Divisions. In the event of the enemy showing signs of weakening, the Lahore Division was to attack and capture the Bois du Biez. Similarly, the Nineteenth Division was to be prepared to extend any success gained by the Second Division by advancing against the southern end of the Rue d’Ouvert. The Artillery bombardment was ordered to commence on September 21st, and continue day and night under instructions issued.