Directions were given to the engine room to keep the highest steam they could possibly get on the boilers, and in case the bridge rang for full speed, to give as much as they possibly could. Orders were also given that ports should be kept closed. [Sidenote: Wireless messages from the Admiralty.] At 7:50 P. M., on May 6, the _Lusitania_ received the following wireless message from the Admiral at Queenstown: "Submarines active off south coast of Ireland," and at 7:56 the vessel asked for and received a repetition of his message. The ship was then going at a rate of 21 knots per hour. At 8:30 P. M. of the same day the following message was received from the British Admiralty: "To All British Ships 0005: "Take Liverpool pilot at bar and avoid headlands. Pass harbors at full speed; steer midchannel course. Submarines off Fastnet." [Sidenote: The _Lusitania's_ speed reduced.] At 8:32 the Admiralty received a communication to show that this message had been received by the _Lusitania_, and the same message was offered to the vessel seven times between midnight of May 6 and 10 A. M. of May 7. At about 8 A. M. on the morning of May 7, on approaching the Irish coast, the vessel encountered an intermittent fog, or Scotch mist, called "banks" in seafaring language, and the speed was reduced to 15 knots. Previously the speed, according to Captain Turner's recollection, had been reduced to 18 knots. This adjustment of speed was due to the fact that Captain Turner wished to run the last 150 miles of the voyage in the dark, so as to make Liverpool early on the morning of May 8, at the earliest time when he could cross the bar without a pilot. [Sidenote: Approaching the most dangerous waters.] Judging from the location of previous submarine attacks, the most dangerous waters in the _Lusitania's_ course were from the entrance to St. George's Channel to Liverpool Bar. There is no dispute as to the proposition that a vessel darkened is much safer from submarine attack at night than in the daytime, and Captain Turner exercised proper and good judgment in planning accordingly as he approached dangerous waters. It is futile to conjecture as to what would or would not have happened had the speed been higher prior to the approach to the Irish coast, because, obviously, until then the Captain could not figure out his situation, not knowing how he might be impeded by fog or other unfavorable weather conditions. On the morning of May 7, 1915, the ship passed about twenty-five or twenty-six, and, in any event, at least eighteen and a half miles south of Fastnet, which was not in sight. The course was then held up slightly to bring the ship closer to land, and a little before noon land was sighted, and what was thought to be Brow Head was made out.