Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before the Summer was too far advanced, and with due regard to the general situation, I desired to postpone my attack as long as possible. The British armies were growing in numbers and the supply of munitions was steadily increasing. Moreover, a very large proportion of the officers and men under my command were still far from being fully trained, and the longer the attack could be deferred the more efficient they would become. On the other hand, the Germans were continuing to press their attacks at Verdun, and both there and on the Italian front, where the Austrian offensive was gaining ground, it was evident that the strain might become too great to be borne unless timely action were taken to relieve it. Accordingly, while maintaining constant touch with General Joffre in regard to all these considerations, my preparations were pushed on, and I agreed, with the consent of his Majesty's Government, that my attack should be launched, whenever the general situation required it, with as great a force as I might then be able to make available. [Sidenote: Pressure on Italian front.] [Sidenote: Heroic French defense at Verdun.] By the end of May, 1916, the pressure of the enemy on the Italian front had assumed such serious proportions that the Russian campaign was opened early in June, and the brilliant successes gained by our allies against the Austrians at once caused a movement of German troops from the western to the eastern front. This, however, did not lessen the pressure on Verdun. The heroic defense of our French allies had already gained many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy very heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of war, it was eventually agreed between General Joffre and myself that the combined French and British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June. [Sidenote: Objects of new offensive.] The object of that offensive was threefold: (i.) To relieve the pressure on Verdun. (ii.) To assist our allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the western front. (iii.) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us. [Sidenote: Enemy attempts at interference.] While my final preparations were in progress the enemy made two unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my arrangements. The first, directed on May 21, 1916, against our positions on the Vimy Ridge, south and southeast of Souchez, resulted in a small enemy gain of no strategic or tactical importance; and rather than weaken my offensive by involving additional troops in the task of recovering the lost ground, I decided to consolidate a position in rear of our original line. [Sidenote: A position lost and retaken.]