The battle of Guilford Courthouse was a British victory which left the
victor weakened to the extent that he was unable to capitalize on his
success. Cornwallis’ loss in officers and men was so heavy that his army
was “crippled beyond measure.” In April, he decided to move to
Wilmington, N. C., on the coast, for the avowed purpose of recruiting
and refitting his exhausted force. Thus the stage was set for the final
campaign of the war.
Cornwallis’ next move changed the strategy of the Southern Campaign. He
did not believe himself strong enough for field action out of Wilmington
and declined to return to Charleston and South Carolina. According to
his own statement, “I was most firmly persuaded, that, _until_ Virginia
was reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces, and that
after its reduction, they would fall without much difficulty.” He made
this decision alone, and Commanding General Sir Henry Clinton in New
York never approved. On April 25, he marched from Wilmington, reaching
Petersburg, Va., on May 20, where he formed a junction with Gen. William
Phillips who commanded the British forces already in the State.
By this time there was already a considerable concentration of troops in
Virginia. Gen. Alexander Leslie had been sent there with a detachment of
troops in October 1780, but he had gone on to join Cornwallis in South
Carolina. Shortly thereafter, another British force under Benedict
Arnold was sent to operate in the area. To contain Arnold’s force, or at
least to watch it, Washington had dispatched the Marquis de Lafayette to
Virginia to work in conjunction with the Baron von Steuben, and later
with Greene. Clinton then countered by sending Phillips with a large
detachment to join Arnold. As a result of these and other moves, but by
no prearranged plan, the stage was set in May 1781, for Virginia to be
the battleground. From the British point of view the subjugation of the
province was the tempting prize. For the Americans, the goal was to
prevent this, and prevent it they did. The strategy of Yorktown was in
the making, but had not yet taken form.
Cornwallis, leading a reasonably well-supplied and able field force of
more than 5,300 troops, was opposed by Lafayette, commanding a small
force not strong enough to risk battle. Lafayette had been ordered by
Greene to remain in Virginia, take command of the troops there, and
defend the State. Even though Lafayette expected reinforcements from the
Pennsylvania Line under Gen. Anthony Wayne, it would not give him battle
strength or even enable him to resist seriously the progress of the
enemy. Consequently, the young general’s first move was to apply in
every direction for more men and supplies.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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